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Case No. 20040471-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a jury conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree felony. 
This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 2004) (pour-over 
provision). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Is the probative value of evidence that defendant threatened the victim—"if 
[you] show[] up in court [you will] be dead"—substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury? 
The decision by a trial court to admit evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
See State v. Lindgren, 910 P.2d 1268, 1271 (Utah App. 1996). 
2. Has defendant established that trial counsel was ineffective for not 
investigating alleged potential witnesses where his claim is entirely on extra-record 
allegations this Court rejected as speculative in denying defendant's rule 23B motion? 
"When a question of trial counsel ineffectiveness is raised for the first time on appeal 
and the review is confined to the trial court record, the question of ineffectiveness of counsel 
is a matter of law, to be reviewed for correctness." State v. Boyatt, 854 P.2d 550, 554 (Utah 
App. 1993). "[Defendant bears the burden of assuring the record is adequate" to review his 
claim of ineffectiveness. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 16, 12 P.3d 92. 
3(A). Can defendant raise a plain error challenge to the trial court's jury 
instruction on the elements of aggravated robbery where trial counsel affirmed on the 
record that defendant took no exception to the instruction below? 
No standard of review applies. Trial counsel affirmed all the instructions given on the 
record, including the aggravated robbery instruction at issue. See R244:164. Thus any error 
was invited and may not be reviewed, even for plain error. See State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 
22, |^ 54, 70 P.3d 111 (holding that if "counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively 
represented to the court that he or she had no objection to the jury instruction, [the appellate 
court] will not review the instruction" even under the plain error exception). 
3(B). Was trial counsel ineffective in affirming the aggravated robbery 
instruction for not including the uncontested element that defendant intended to 
permanently or temporarily deprive the 7-Eleven of the stolen beer? 
2 
The standard of review is the same as that stated in issue 2. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-301 (West 2004): 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take 
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate 
presence, against his will, by means of force or fear, and with a purpose or 
intent to deprive the person permanently or temporarily of the personal 
property; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of 
immediate force against another in the course of committing a theft or 
wrongful appropriation. 
(2) An act is considered to be "in the course of committing a theft or wrongful 
appropriate" if it occurs: 
(a) in the course of an attempt to commit theft or wrongful 
appropriation; 
(b) in the commission of theft or wrongful appropriation; or 
(c) in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-302 (West 2004): 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
764-601; 
(b) causes seriously bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course 
of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of 
a robbery. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-601 (West 2004): 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title: . . . 
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(5) "Dangerous weapon" means: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and: 
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the 
victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily 
injury; or 
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other 
manner that he is in control of such an item. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Charge. Defendant was charged with aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in 
violation ofUTAH CODE ANN. §76-6-302 (West 2004). R94-95. The charge was subject to 
a gang enhancement pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.1 (West 2004). See R94-95. 
Conviction. Following a one-day jury trial on 19 February 2004, defendant was 
convicted as charged. R156-157; R244:199. 
Sentence. The trial court imposed the statutory indeterminate term of 9-years-to-life, 
which it then suspended and placed defendant on a three-year term of probation. R197-98, 
201. 
Notice of appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal in the Utah Supreme 
Court. R211. 
Transfer order. The supreme court transferred the case to this Court. R239. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
The night of 6 February 2003, defendant and his friends, Peni Teo and Ruland 
Anthony, were up late drinking brandy and coke. R244:24, 26, 28-30. Defendant was 
depressed and wanted to get "wasted." R244:99. When they ran out of brandy, defendant 
suggested that they stop at a 7-Eleven for some beer. R244:32-33, 99. Teo, who was 
driving, parked the car on the road at the side of the store rather than the parking lot, for an 
easier get away. R244:32, 100. Defendant said he was going to "go in there and grab the 
beer and come back out." R244:33. Defendant got out of the car and walked into the store. 
R244:34. Although Anthony followed defendant toward the store, he eventually stopped and 
waited by the corner of the building. Id. 
Once in the store, defendant went to the beer cooler and removed two cases of beer. 
R244:37, 60, 63. He then quickly walked past the cash register and toward the front door. 
R244:63-65. As he neared the door, one of the store clerks, Terrye Rowland, stood by the 
door and said, "Let's not do this." R244:61, 64. Defendant ignored her and walked out of 
the door. R244:65. Terrye had to step out of the way to avoid being run over. R244:64-65. 
Terrye followed defendant. R244:35, 65-67. As defendant passed the comer of the 
store, she heard him say, "She's right behind me." R244:67. Terrye then saw Anthony, who 
put his hand down the front of his pants and said, "Stop, bitch, or I'll shoot you." R244:67-
]The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76,%2, 12 P.3d 92. 
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68. Terrye stopped, and defendant and Anthony walked toward the car. R244:69. Terrye 
moved slowly behind the car and read its license plate number. Id. Anthony turned and put 
his hand down his pants again and said, "Didn't you hear what I said?" Id. He and defendant 
then got in the car. R244:71. Peni drove the trio to defendant's sister's apartment where they 
"cracked the cases open and started handing the beer out." R244A24; see also R244:3$,122. 
Terrye immediately notified the police of the beer heist. R244:74. Within minutes, 
Deputy Wilson arrived. R244:91-92. Terrye's manager gave him the video tape from the 
in-store surveillance camera and the license plate number of the car. R244:92. Using the 
license plate number, Deputy Wilson located the car in the parking lot of a nearby apartment 
building. R244:92-93. He staked the car out with another deputy and arrested defendant, 
Peni, and Ruland when they left the apartment complex. R244:92-96. During the arrest, 
defendant confessed that it was his idea to steal the beer, that he made it clear to Peni and 
Ruland that he was going to steal the beer, and that he thought Ruland threatened Terrye only 
to scare her into not calling the police. R244:100-01. He also claimed that Ruland did not, 
in fact, have a gun. Id. 
During the months between the robbery and defendant's trial, defendant was ordered 
to stay away from the 7-Eleven. R244:76. Despite that order, he visited the 7-Eleven at least 
four times. Id. During the last of those visits, he told Terrye that "if [she] showed up in 
court [she] would be dead." R244:77. 
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At trial, the State presented testimony from Peni, Terrye, and Deputy Wilson. 
R244;21-107. Deputy Wilson recounted defendant's confession. R244:97-101. Bothheand 
Terrye testified about defendant's post-robbery threat. R244;76-77,101-02. The State also 
introduced the video tape from the 7-Eleven surveillance camera. R244:95, 108. 
During the State's case in chief, defense counsel elicited testimony that Peni had pled 
guilty to robbery and agreed to testify in exchange for a two-step reduction in his conviction. 
R244:43,47-48. Counsel also introduced evidence that Terrye had previously pled guilty to 
attempted welfare fraud. R244:78. 
After the State rested, defendant took the stand and related his version of the events. 
R244:119-28. He admitted stealing the beer, but denied hearing either Terrye or Ruland say 
anything as he left the store and got in the car. R244:123-24. He also denied visiting the 7-
Eleven after the robbery and threatening Terrye. R244:128. 
In closing argument, defense counsel asserted that the State overcharged the case and 
that defendant was only guilty of retail theft, not aggravated robbery. R244:177. He pointed 
out that defendant did not take the beer from Terrye's person or immediate presence because 
she was on the opposite side of the store from the beer cooler when defendant took the beer. 
R244:179. He also argued that Ruland did not have a weapon or a facsimile or 
representation of a weapon. R244:182. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. The probative value of evidence that defendant threatened Terrye if she 
testified against him is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste 
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. The witness tampering evidence 
is highly relevant to defendant's consciousness of his guilt. For this reason the evidence was 
more probative than it was unfairly prejudicial. Contrary to defendant's unsupported claim, 
the witness tampering evidence is not rendered less probative merely because Terrye was 
unable to pinpoint the exact date defendant threatened her. The strength of the witness 
tampering evidence is only one of a variety of matters which should be considered and is not 
alone determinative. The trial court's well-supported admissibility ruling should therefore 
be upheld. 
Even if the witness tampering evidence were erroneously admitted, the trial court gave 
a limiting instruction cautioning jurors that they could not convict defendant for aggravated 
robbery based solely on evidence of the witness tampering. There was also a wealth of 
additional evidence proving defendant's guilt. Indeed, defendant's and his testifying cohort's 
versions of the aggravated robbery differed only slightly from Terrye's. While defendant and 
Peni Teo claimed not to have heard a third cohort, Ruland Anthony, threaten Terrye, they 
also had an obvious motive for minimizing Ruland's conduct here. The jury thus reasonably 
accepted Terrye's testimony over that of defendant's and Peni's, and would have done so, 
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even without her further testimony that defendant later threatened her if she testified against 
him. 
Point II. Defendant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate 
potential witnesses is inadequate as a matter of law. This is because defendant bases his 
claim entirely on extra-record allegations he previously raised in an unsuccessful rule 23B 
remand motion. Defendant thus asks this Court to accept as substantive evidence extra-
record allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. This Court has already rejected those 
allegations as speculative. Because the record on appeal remains devoid of non-speculative 
evidence supporting defendant's claim of ineffectiveness, his claim lacks merit and must be 
rejected. 
Point III. Defendant asserts that the trial court plainly erred in instructing the jury 
on the elements of aggravated robbery because the instruction did not include the element 
that defendant intended to permanently or temporarily deprive the 7-Eleven store of the 
stolen beer. Defendant's plain error challenge is foreclosed by the invited error doctrine 
because trial counsel affirmed the instruction on the record. Thus, only trial counsel's 
performance is relevant here. Defendant can prevail only if he can show that trial counsel's 
on-the-record affirmation of the aggravated robbery instruction was both deficient and 
prejudicial. Defendant cannot show that trial counsel's performance was deficient because 
his non-objection to, and affirmation of, the aggravated robbery instruction was consistent 
with defendant's trial strategy. Defendant has never contested that he was guilty of the beer 
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theft; he disputed only the threat which elevated the offense from a misdemeanor to a first 
degree felony. Nor was trial counsel's performance prejudicial. This is because the missing 
element of intent to permanently or temporarily deprive was never at issue. This Court has 
previously recognized that if the facts indisputably establish an element and the element is 
not an issue at trial, a trial court's failure to instruct on the element is not prejudicial. A 
complete instruction here would have changed nothing, because, as set forth above, 
defendant never claimed that he intended to return the stolen beer. Rather, defendant's 
defense was that he did not take the beer in a forceful or threatening manner. Thus, even if 
the jury had been instructed that defendant had to intend to permanently or temporarily 
deprive the 7-Eleven store of the stolen beer, a reasonable jury would have found that well-
established and undisputed intent here. Defendant's claim of ineffectiveness should 
therefore be rejected. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT 
THREATENED THE VICTIM—"IF [YOU] SHOW[] UP IN COURT 
[YOU WILL] BE DEAD99—IS NOT SUBSTANTIALLY OUTWEIGHED 
BY THE DANGER OF UNFAIR PREJUDICE, CONFUSION OF THE 
ISSUES, OR MISLEADING THE JURY 
In Point I of his brief, defendant claims that "the trial court erred in denying [his] 
request to prohibit the prosecution . . . from introducing . . . evidence regarding the alleged 
instances of witness tampering." Aplt. Br. at 8 (capitalization and boldface omitted). 
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Specifically, defendant claims that evidence he threatened Terrye Rowland that "if [she] 
showed up in court [she] would be dead/' see R244:77, should have been excluded because 
he was "only made aware of allegations for the dates of June 30, 2003 and July 10, 2003," 
but that at trial Terrye testified that he threatened her "near the end of July, 2003." Aplt. Br. 
at 10. Defendant contends that it was thus "difficult for [him] to defend against the . . . 
allegations or to present an alibi defense" because he did not have "the necessary specifics 
to allow him to mount a proper defense[.]" Id. Defendant therefore contends that evidence 
of the witness tampering, "although relevant, should have been prohibited [under rule 403, 
Utah Rules of Evidence,] as its probative value is far outweighed by the unfair prejudice 
caused by forcing [him] to attempt to defend against a vague allegation which was 
unsupported by evidence other than [Terrye's] own statements." Aplt. Br. at 10-11. 
Defendant's claim lacks merit and should be rejected. 
Proceedings below. Before trial on 18 February 2004, trial counsel asked that 
evidence of defendant's witness tampering be excluded: 
There's an allegation that [defendant] pulled up in a car with several other 
individuals and said something to Miss Rowland and the State is going to try 
to bring that in. We would ask that that be left out. We think that it's more 
prejudicial than probative. It's not relevant. And it isn't [the] subject of 
another criminal offense—or criminal charge. 
R244:9. The trial court interjected that it was his recollection that defendant "said to Ms. 
Rowland something to the effect that[, ']you show up in court and you're a dead lady[,'] or 
something to that effect[.]" Id. Trial counsel affirmed the trial court's recollection: "In 
11 * 
essence that5 s what the allegation said." Id. The trial court further observed that if defendant 
in fact made the threat it "would be relevant to show that he had a guilty state of mind, he 
wanted to keep the witnesses from coming to court[.]" R244:10. Trial counsel asserted that 
even if the witness tampering evidence was relevant, its "probative value [was] greatly 
outweighed by the prejudice. We haven't been given a specific date as to when that 
occurred, so we can't create an alibi. It's sort of a vague allegation that we really can't 
defend and I think it would be more prejudicial than probative to let that statement in." Id. 
Thereafter, the trial court denied defendant's request to exclude the witness tampering 
evidence: 
The danger of unfair prejudice in my judgment is not outweighed by its 
probative value if [defendant] or anyone charged with a crime threatens a 
witness, that would certainly have some bearing on their state of mind and 
whether or not they felt that they were guilty and the efforts they would make 
to keep a witness from appearing in court would be relevant in my judgment. 
So I'll overrule the objection, or deny the motion. 
R244-.ll. 
Accordingly, at trial, Terrye affirmed that although defendant had been ordered to stay 
away from the 7-Eleven pending trial, she had seen him there on four different occasions. 
R244:76. Defendant did not speak to Terrye the first three times he entered the 7-Eleven 
after the beer heist. Id. But on the fourth time, toward the end of July 2003, defendant told 
Terrye that "if [she] showed up in court [she] would be dead." R244:77. Shortly thereafter, 
on 5 August 2003, Terrye quit her job at 7-Eleven "[bjecause of what [defendant] said." Id. 
The trial court instructed the jury, however, that evidence of defendant's threat or 
12 
witness tampering was insufficient by itself to establish defendant's guilt of the aggravated 
robbery and that the witness tampering evidence could only be considered "in light of all 
other proven facts in the case in determining" defendant's "guilt or innocence" of aggravated 
robbery. R152 (jury instruction # 26) (a copy is attached in addendum A). 
Analysis. "When reviewing a trial court's ruling regarding the admissibility of 
evidence under Rule 403, '[this court] will not overturn the [trial] court's determination 
unless it was an abuse of discretion.'" State v. Lindgren, 910 P.2d 1268, 1271 (Utah App. 
1996) (additional internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. White, 880 P.2d 18,20 
(Utah App. 1994)) (additional citations omitted). Because the decision to admit or exclude 
evidence under rule 403 lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, "[the reviewing] 
court will only conclude that a trial court abused its discretion if the ruling 'was beyond the 
limits of reasonability.'"/d. (quoting State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d232,239-40 (Utah 1992)). 
Although conceding its relevance, defendant argues that the probative value of 
evidence that he threatened Terrye, or that he committed witness tampering here, was 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and thus should have been excluded under rule 
403. Aplt. Br. at 10-11. But relevant prejudicial evidence "may be excluded"only "if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Utah R. Evid. 403 (emphasis added). 
13 
"[Ejvidence is not unfairly prejudicial simply because it is detrimental to a party's 
case." State v. Kooyman, 2005 UT App 222, % 26, P.3d (internal quotations marks 
omitted) (quoting United States v. Magleby, 241 F.3d 1306, 1315 (10th Cir. 2001)). 
Moreover, under rule 403, relevant evidence is presumed admissible unless it '"has an 
unusual propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead the jury.'" State v. Jaeger, 1999 
UT 1, 1f 18, 973 P.2d 404 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1221 (Utah 1993) 
(additional citations omitted)). The presumption is reversed in favor of inadmissibility only 
for evidence that is "'uniquely subject to being used to distort the deliberative process and 
skew a trial's outcome. '"Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1222 (quoting State v Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 
1229 (Utah 1989)). The Utah Supreme Court has identified only three categories of evidence 
that are so prejudicial as to reverse the presumption. See State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 
1256-57 (Utah 1988); White, 880 P.2d at 21. The three categories are (1) gruesome 
photographs of a homicide victim's corpse, (2) a rape victim's past sexual activities with 
someone other than the accused, and (3) statistical evidence of matters not susceptible to 
quantitative analysis, such as witness veracity. See White, 880 P.2d at 21. 
In the instant case, defendant's threat that Terrye "would be dead" "if [she] showed 
up in court," see R244:77, does not fall into one of the three categories of presumptively 
prejudicial evidence. Evidence of defendant's threat or witness tampering, therefore, is 
presumed admissible unless its relevance "is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury." Utah. R. Evid. 403. 
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Defendant has not shown that the relevance of the threat or witness tampering 
evidence is "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury." Utah. R. Evid. 403. As noted, defendant does not dispute 
the relevance of the witness tampering evidence. Aplt. Br. at 10 ("The introduction of this 
evidence, although relevant, should have been prohibited as its probative value is far 
outweighed by the unfair prejudice"). Nor could he. As found by the trial court, the threat 
evidence has "some bearing on [defendant's] state of mind and whether or not [he] felt that 
[he was] guilty and the efforts [he] would make to keep a witness from appearing in court 
would be relevant in my judgment." R244:11. For this purpose, the trial court found that the 
evidence was more probative than it was unfairly prejudicial. Id. 
The trial court was correct. Courts have uniformly held that a defendant's improper 
attempts to influence a witness's testimony are admissible because such evidence is highly 
relevant to tne derendant's "consciousness of guilt." See, e.g., United States v. Gonsalves, 
668 F.2d 73, 74-76 (1st Cir. 1983) (Gonsalves's threat against adverse witness relevant to 
show consciousness of guilt); United States v. Henderson, 58 F.3d 1145,1150 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(evidence of Henderson's attempts to influence prosecution witness evinced his guilty 
conscience of the underlying crimes); United States v. Borland, 12 M.J. 855, 857 (A.F. Ct. 
App. 1981) (Borland's request that witness lie for him was admissible to show consciousness 
of guilt); State v. Williams, 904 P.2d 437,441-45 (Ariz. 1995) (evidence that Williams sought 
to suppress adverse evidence was relevant to show consciousness of guilt); Morris v. State, 
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731 S.W.2d 230, 231-232 (Ark. 1987) (attempted persuasion of a witness to change her 
testimony is relevant to show consciousness of guilt); State v. Baker, 113 P.2d 1194, 1199 
(Mont. 1989) (Baker's suggestion to prosecution witness that he might "accidentally 
somehow" get amnesia, and his offer to send money if proven innocent was admissible as 
impeachment evidence to show consciousness of guilt); Garza v. State, 358 S.W.2d 622,623 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1962) (efforts of accused to induce a witness to testify falsely may be 
shown as indicating consciousness of guilt). 
A defendant' s attempt to bribe, threaten, or otherwise improperly influence a witness' s 
testimony "indicates 'his consciousness that his case is a weak or unfounded one; and from 
that consciousness may be inferred the fact itself of the cause's lack of truth and merit."5 
United States v. Mendez-Ortiz, 810 F.2d 76, 79 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting Wigmore, Evidence 
§ 278 (Chadbourn Rev. 1979)). It is a logical assumption that the "typical innocent person 
would not resort to" bribery, threats, or asking a witness to lie for him. Edward J. 
Imwinkelreid, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence, Tf3:04, at 9-10 (Rev. Ed. 1998). Moreover, 
"[l]ike evidence of flight from the scene of a crime, bribery of an adverse witness, or the 
destruction of incriminating evidence, threats made by a defendant respecting a specific 
hostile witness may imply that the party making the threat has something specific to hide." 
Gonsalves, 668 F.2d at 75. "The desire to 'cover something up,' in turn, implies a 
consciousness of guilt of the particular crime charged." Id. Certainly, a defendant's attempt 
to avoid conviction by threatening the robbery victim, as here, is an important, relevant fact 
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that the jury should know in assessing the validity and credibility of the defendant's stated 
position. See Henderson v. State, 910 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Ark. 1995) ("factfinder is entitled 
to know whether a defendant attempted to thwart his prosecution by secreting a witness who 
had implicated him in the charged offense"), denial of habeas corpus reversed on other 
grounds by Henderson v. Norris, 258 F.3d 706 (8th Cir. 2001). 
Defendant's threat or witness tampering is not rendered any less relevant or probative 
merely because he willingly admitted that he committed retail theft. See, e.g., R244:179-180 
(trial counsel: "This is a retail theft. . . . [Defendant's] intent was to steal the beer"). 
Evidence does not cease to be relevant because the defendant does not contest or offers to 
stipulate to particular facts. Indeed, "a stipulation of fact by defense counsel does not make 
evidence less relevant, nor is it a basis for depriving the prosecution the opportunity of 
profiting from the "'legitimate moral force'" of its evidence in persuading a jury." State v. 
Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, % 37, 106 P.3d 735; see also State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 475 
(Utah 1988) ("A cold stipulation can deprive a party 'of the legitimate moral force of his 
evidence,' and can never fully substitute for tangible, physical evidence of the testimony of 
witnesses") (citations omitted). "[S]o long as the defendant maintains[s] his guilty plea, the 
State [has] the right to prove its case up to the hilt in whatever manner it [chooses], subject 
only to the rules of evidence and standards of fair play." State v. Florez, 111 P.2d 452, 455 
(Utah 1989) (alterations in original) (quotation marks omitted) (quotingPeople v. Hills, 532 
N.Y.S2d 269, 277 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988)). Moreover, because defendant admitted only 
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misdemeanor retail theft—as opposed to the first degree felony aggravated robbery with 
which he was charged—the witness tampering evidence is even more relevant and probative 
than it would have been otherwise. The jury could have reasonably inferred from the witness 
tampering evidence that if defendant were truly guilty only of a misdemeanor theft as he 
claimed, he would not have gone to the extreme measure of threatening the victim's life if 
she testified against him. See R244:76-77. 
Contrary to defendant's claim, evidence of his threat or witness tampering is not 
rendered less probative merely because Terrye could not specify an exact date for its 
occurrence. See R244:76. Defendant's complaint about Terrye's inability to pinpoint the 
date on which he made the threat is a challenge to the strength of the witness tampering 
evidence and is thus a properly considered as one factor in determining the probative value 
of the threat. See State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291,295 (Utah 1988) (observing that "a variety 
of matters must be considered" in determining probative value, "including the strength of the 
evidence as to the commission of the other crime"). But, the strength of the allegedly 
unfairly prejudicial evidence is only one "of a variety of matters" which "must be 
considered" and no one factor alone is determinative. Id. Thus, while Terrye's inability to 
specify the exact date the threat occurred could have arguably been used to impeach her 
testimony, it is not by itself grounds for excluding the threat evidence under rule 403.2 
2Defendant chose not to cross-examine Terrye regarding the threat or witness 
tampering incident, focusing instead on Terrye's prior conviction for attempted welfare 
fraud and the fact that she never saw a gun or any other weapon during the robbery. See, 
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Finally, there is nothing unfairly prejudicial about defendant's threat. It is not the type 
of evidence that would make a jury convict for the wrong reason. It is not gruesome, sexual, 
or statistical evidence incapable of quantitative analysis. See White, 880 P.2d at 21. Rather, 
defendant's threat was highly connected to the aggravated robbery that prompted it. The trial 
court also instructed the jury they could only use defendant's threat for a proper purpose. 
See R152 (jury instruction #26), addendum A. Juries are assumed to follow a trial court's 
instructions. See Salt Lake City v. Garcia, 912 P.2d 997, 1001 (Utah App. 1996). 
But, even if admitting evidence of the threat or witness tampering incident were error, 
its admission was harmless in this case. Error is harmful only when but for its commission, 
there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome. State v. Medina-Juarez, 2001 UT 
79, T| 18, 34 P.3d 187. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). In 
determining whether an error was harmful, a court considers a number of factors, including 
"the overall strength of the State's case." State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232,240 (Utah 1992). 
"The more evidence . . . the less likely there was harmful error." Id. 
The only disputed issues here were whether defendant committed aggravated robbery 
as opposed to retail theft, and whether defendant later threatened Terrye if she testified 
against him. Importantly, the jury was instructed that evidence of the witness tampering was 
insufficient by itself to support aggravated robbery and that it must be considered along with 
e.g., R244:77-7K 83. 
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the other evidence of the aggravated robbery. See R152 (instruction # 26), addendum A. 
Given this limiting instruction and the weight of the evidence against defendant, the jury did 
not convict him for aggravated robbery merely because he also threatened Terrye if she 
testified against him. 
Indeed, defendant's own testimony corroborated Terrye's regarding the beer heist up 
until his cohort, Ruland Anthony, threatened Terrye. See R244:121 -124. Defendant claimed 
not to have heard anything Terrye or his cohort said to each other. Id. According to Deputy 
Wilson, however, at the time of his arrest, defendant posited that Ruland threatened Terrye 
in order to stop her from following them. R244:100-01. Defendant's other cohort, the 
driver, Peni Teo, also corroborated Terrye's testimony up to the time the threat was made. 
Specifically, Peni said that Ruland got out of the car with defendant, but stopped short of 
entering the 7-Eleven. R244:34-36. Peni viewed a verbal exchange between Ruland and 
Terrye, but like defendant denied hearing what was said. R244:36. Thus, all three witnesses 
confirm that Ruland was where Terrye said he was when he made the threat. At trial, Peni 
and defendant differed from Terrye's testimony only as to whether the threat was made, 
although, as stated, defendant admitted to Deputy Wilson that he did hear a threat. Both 
defendant and Peni also have obvious motives for minimizing Ruland's conduct here. 
Terrye, on the other hand, had no motive to misrepresent Ruland's threat, and her version 
was further corroborated by Deputy Wilson's testimony regarding statements defendant made 
at the time of his arrest. See R244:100-01. The jury thus reasonably accepted Terrye's 
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testimony over that of defendant's and Peni's, even though she had a prior conviction for 
attempted welfare fraud. See R244:77-78. There is therefore no reasonable likelihood that 
the jury would have lost confidence in Terrye's testimony without her further testimony of 
defendant's subsequent threat or witness tampering. Medina-Juarez, 2001 UT 79, \ 18; 
Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 240. The well-supported jury verdict should, therefore, be affirmed. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT CANNOT ESTABLISH THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WAS 
INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT INVESTIGATING ALLEGED POTENTIAL 
WITNESSES BECAUSE HE RELIES ENTIRELY ON EXTRA-
RECORD MATERIAL TO SUPPORT HIS CLAIM 
In Point 11(A) of his brief, defendant alleges that "trial counsel was ineffective due to 
his failure to adequately investigate the [defendant's case and present witness testimony 
impeaching the credibility of the victim[.]" Aplt. Br. at 11. Defendant claims this alleged 
testimony was "particularly] critical in this case since the only evidence presented at trial 
regarding the alleged threat made to the victim by the co-defendant was the victim's own 
testimony." Id. 
As explained below, defendant has not carried his burden of demonstrating his claim 
of ineffective assistance because it is entirely based on extra-record material and without any 
factual support in the record. 
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A. Defendant has the burden to provide an adequate record to 
support his claims. 
To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant "must first 
demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 19, 12 
P.3d 92 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984)). Defendant must 
also "show that counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial—i.e., that it affected the 
outcome of the case." Id. The first part of defendant's burden requires that he "rebut the 
strong presumption that 'under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered 
sound trial strategy.'" Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689) (other internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). 
When a defendant raises a claim of trial counsel's effectiveness on direct appeal, he 
or she "bears the burden of assuring the record is adequate." Litherland, 200 UT 76, \ 16. 
"The necessary consequence of this burden is that an appellate court will presume that any 
argument of ineffectiveness presented to it is supported by all the relevant evidence of which 
defendant is aware." Id. at Tf 17. When the record is "inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities 
or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel 
performed effectively." Id. Furthermore, it is well-settled that "[a]n appellate court's 
'review is . . . limited to the evidence contained in the record on appeal.'" State v. Pliego, 
1999 UT 8, f 7, 974 P.2d 279 (quoting Wilderness Bldg. Sys., Inc. v. Chapman, 699 P.2d 
766,768 (Utah 1985)). See also Chapman v. Chapman, 728 P.2d 121,123 (Utah 1986) (per 
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curiam) (appellate court cannot consider matters outside the record); State v. Hutchings, 672 
P.2d4045 404 (Utah 1983) (same); State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157,1162 (Utah App. 1998) 
(An appellate court "simply cannot rule on a question which depends for its existence upon 
alleged facts unsupported by the record"). 
B. Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is not 
supported by record facts. 
Defendant's claim of ineffectiveness is wholly unsupported in the record and, in fact, 
defendant impermissibly relies on extra-record material to support his claim that trial counsel 
allegedly failed to adequately investigate. 
Defendant claims that before trial, his family and friends met with trial counsel and 
identified several witnesses for counsel to call at trial. Aplt. Br. at 13. Defendant claims that 
trial counsel's failure to call these alleged witnesses constituted deficient performance and 
that this failure prejudiced him because "[trial counsel] presented no independent evidence 
or testimony regarding Terrye Rowland's credibility as a witness," and the alleged "defense 
witnesses in questions rendered the victim, Terrye Rowland's, statements less than 
credible[.]" Aplt. Br. at 15. Nothing in the record supports defendant's claim that he 
identified witnesses to counsel who would impeach Terrye's credibility before trial. Absent 
any record support for this claim, it fails. Litherland, 200 UT 76, ^J16. 
Given the lack of record support for his claim of ineffectiveness, defendant's brief 
rehashes his failed motion for remand under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
See, e.g., Aplt. Br. at 13 (citing affidavits "which were attached to the Defendant's Motion 
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for Remand which was previously denied"). See also Motion to Remand Pursuant to Rule 
23B and Order Denying Remand (copies are attached in addendum B). Although defendant 
acknowledges that the Court denied his rule 23B motion, he does not hesitate to ask that the 
Court accept as substantive evidence, the very extra-record allegations the Court has already 
rejected as mere speculation. See Order, dated 23 February 2005, see addendum B. 
Defendant's reliance on these extra-record allegations is improper and should be rejected. 
See State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285,290 (Utah App. 1998) (granting State's motion to strike 
portions of Bredehoft's brief that relied upon his rule 23B affidavit on the ground that rule 
23B affidavits are not substantive evidence of ineffective assistance). 
Because the Court denied defendant's rule 23B motion, the record on appeal remains 
devoid of non-speculative evidence that trial counsel was ineffective for not investigating 
alleged potential witnesses. Absent any evidence that trial counsel should have known of, 
or called, the alleged potential witnesses identified in his brief, this Court must presume that 
trial counsel acted effectively. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 17. "This presumption is 
consistent with the fundamental policies" undergirding ineffective assistance jurisprudence, 
that "'courts must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance,'"/ d. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689), "and 
with the general rule that record inadequacies result in an assumption of regularity on 
appeal." Id. (citing State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1226 (Utah 1997)). Defendant's 
wholly speculative claim of ineffectiveness thus fails as a matter of law. Id. 
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POINT III 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF PLAIN INSTRUCTIONAL ERROR IS 
PRECLUDED BY THE INVITED ERROR DOCTRINE AND HIS 
CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IS NOT 
SUPPORTABLE BECAUSE TRIAL COUNSEL'S AFFIRMATION OF 
THE AGGRAVATED ROBBERY INSTRUCTION WAS 
REASONABLE TRIAL STRATEGY 
In Points 11(B) and III of his brief, defendant asserts that the trial court's instruction 
on the elements of aggravated robbery was plainly erroneous because it did not include the 
uncontested element that defendant intended to permanently or temporarily deprive the 7-
Eleven store of the stolen beer. Aplt. Br. at 17-21. Defendant alternatively argues that his 
counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the instruction. Defendant may not obtain plain 
error review of this claim because he invited any error by affirmatively approving the 
instruction. Trial counsel was not ineffective for doing so because it was reasonable trial 
strategy. 
Proceedings below. As noted, defendant's strategy below was to admit the beer theft, 
but to deny that he or his any of his cohorts threatened Terrye in stealing the beer. See R83 
("At trial, the Defendant Netzler will not dispute identification or that a theft of beer 
occurred. However, the Defendant will dispute that the theft occurred with the use of force 
or fear or that a gun was used or that the use of a gun was threatened"). Accordingly, trial 
counsel's opening statement informed the jury that defendant would testify and admit to 
stealing the beer, but that defendant would deny doing so with force. See R244:l 18 ("Mr. 
Netzler will tell you that he took the beer"). Just as trial counsel promised, defendant took 
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the stand and testified that he stole two cases of beer from the 7-Eleven: "I jumped out of the 
car, went in the store, and I looked at the freezer and I walked over there and grabbed two 
cases of beer." R244:121. Instead of stopping at the register to pay for the beer, defendant 
"went to a quick step to walk out of the store." Id. Defendant affirmed that it was his 
intention to "[jjust grab the beer and leave," "[j]ust steal the beer." R244:122. According 
to defendant, he and his friends then drove back to defendant's "brother-in-law's house" and 
consumed the beer: "And we went there and just cracked the cases open and started handing 
the beer out." R244:124. Defendant also acknowledged telling Officer Wilson that stealing 
the beer was his idea. R244:125-126; see also R244:131-132. 
Defendant challenged other of the trial court's proposed instructions, but did not 
challenge the trial court's instruction on the elements of aggravated robbery, even though it 
did not include the element that defendant intended to permanently or temporarily deprive 
the 7-Eleven store of the stolen beer. See, e.g., R244:150-155, 162; see also R136 
(instruction # 11) (a copy is attached in addendum C). 
Significantly, defendant proposed instructions on the lesser-included-offense of retail 
theft, see R61-62, similarly lacked the element that defendant took the beer "with the 
intention of depriving the merchant permanently of the possession, use or benefit of [the 
beer] without paying the retail value of [the beer]." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-602( 1) (West 
2004). Defendant's proposed instructions were given in substance. Compare R61-62 and 
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R142 (instruction # 17) (copies of defendant's proposed instructions, along with the trial 
court's retail theft instruction, are attached in addendum C). 
Defendant's non-objection to the aggravated robbery instruction and his proposed 
retail theft instructions were consistent with his strategy to admit that he committed retail 
theft and deny only the aggravating conduct. Indeed, during the course of discussing the 
proposed jury instructions, trial counsel affirmed that he would not deny that defendant 
committed retail theft in his closing argument. R244:164. When the trial court asked if 
defendant took "any exception" to the finalized instructions, trial counsel affirmed that he 
did not: "No, your Honor." Id. Finally, the trial court further inquired if counsel was 
"satisfied" with the finalized instructions and trial counsel replied, "I am." Id. 
Thereafter, the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of aggravated robbery 
and the lesser offense of retail theft, but did not include in either instruction the element that 
the defendant intended to deprive the 7-Eleven store of the stolen beer. See Rl 36 (instruction 
#11) (aggravated robbery); R142 (instruction # 17 (retail theft)), see addendum C. 
Following jury instruction, both parties presented closing argument and trial counsel 
repeatedly asserted that defendant's intent was only to steal the beer and thus defendant was 
guilty of no more than retail theft. SfeeR244:179-182, 184, 186-187. 
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A. Any error in the elements instruction for aggravated robbery was 
invited; therefore, review for plain error is foreclosed. 
As noted above, defendant claims that the trial court's elements instruction on 
aggravated robbery was plainly erroneous because it "failed to include an essential intent 
element, i.e., that the [djefendant take the personal property of another 'with the purpose or 
intent to deprive the person permanently or temporarily of the personal property."5 Aplt. Br. 
at 19 (citingR135-136 (instructions ##10-11)). See afeo UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-3 01(l)(a) 
(West 2004) ("A person commits robbery if... the person unlawfully and intentionally takes 
or attempts to take personal property in the possession of another from his person, or 
immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or fear, and with a purpose or intent 
to deprive the person permanently or temporarily of the personal property"). 
Defendant's claim of plain instructional error is foreclosed by the invited error 
doctrine. In addition to not objecting to the elements instruction for aggravated robbery, and 
submitting a retail theft instruction which lacked a similar intent element, trial counsel 
approved all of the instructions given on the record, see R244:164. Thus, any defect in the 
elements instruction for aggravated robbery was invited and may not now be reviewed. See 
State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, ffif 62-63, 520 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (declining to review claim of 
instructional error where defendant "signaled] by an affirmative act that he had no 
objection" to the instruction below). See also State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ^  54, 70 P.3d 
111 (holding that if "counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the court 
that he or she had no objection to the jury instruction, [the appellate court] will not review 
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the instruction" even under plain error exception); State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155,159 (Utah 
1989) (declining to reach plain error claim—where non-objection was conscious 
strategy—because it would "be sanctioning a procedure that fosters invited error"). Thus, 
only trial counsel's performance is relevant here and defendant can prevail only if he can 
show that trial counsel's on-the-record affirmation of the instructions given was 
constitutionally ineffective. 
B. Trial counsel acted reasonably in affirming an elements instruction 
that did not include an uncontested element 
For relief under the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine, "defendant must (i) 
identify specific acts or omissions by counsel that fall below the standard of reasonable 
professional assistance when considered at the time of the act or omission and under all the 
attendant circumstances, and (ii) demonstrate that counsel's error prejudiced the defendant, 
i.e., that but for the error, there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been 
more favorable to the defendant." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1225 (Utah 1993). If 
defendant fails to establish either deficient performance or prejudice, his claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel fails as a matter of law. State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 61 (Utah 
1993). "Given the arduous nature of the defendant's burden, ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims rarely succeed." State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah App. 1993). 
No deficient performance. Similar to his claim of plain error, defendant asserts that 
trial counsel was deficient because he did not object to the elements instruction on 
aggravated robbery, which "failed to include an essential element of intent, i.e., that the 
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[djefendant take the personal property of another 'with the purpose or intent to deprive the 
person permanently or temporarily of the personal property.'" Aplt. Br. at 17 (citing R135-
136). See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-301(l)(a) (West 2004). Defendant cannot prevail 
on his claim of deficient performance, however, because trial counsel's affirmation of the 
aggravated robbery instruction was reasonable on this record. See State v. Litherland, 2000 
UT 76, \ 19, 12 P.3d 92 (holding ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails if counsel's 
"actions might be considered sound trial strategy") (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted)). 
"The Sixth Amendment guarantees reasonable competence, not perfect advocacy 
judged with the benefit of hindsight." Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003). 
Therefore, to prove that trial counsel's affirmation of the aggravated robbery instruction fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness, "defendant must overcome the strong 
presumption that trial counsel rendered adequate assistance by persuading the court that there 
was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, f^ 6, 
89 P.3d 162 (internal quotations and citations omitted, emphasis in original). "If the 
conceivable tactical bas[e]s for defense counsel's actions are appairent, [djefendant has not 
overcome the strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance . . . . " State v. Holbert, 2002 UT App 426, j^ 58, 61 P.3d 
281 (internal quotations and citations omitted, first alteration in original); see also State v. 
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Parker, 2000 UT 51, f 11, 4 P.3d 778 (no deficiency where counsel conceivably acted 
deliberately and tactically). 
Defendant has not and cannot make this showing. Defendant fails to acknowledge 
in his brief that his strategy below was to admit stealing the beer and deny only that either 
he or his cohorts threatened Terrye for purposes of the aggravated robbery statute. Compare 
Aplt. Br. at 17-18 and R244:123-124, 177, 179, 182. Accordingly, as set forth above, 
defendant has never disputed that he took the beer, or that he intended to permanently or 
temporarily deprive the 7-Eleven store of the stolen beer. R83; see also R244:122-124. To 
the contrary, defendant has steadfastly maintained that taking or depriving the 7-Eleven of 
the beer was the extent of his intent here. Id. Specifically, defendant's strategy was to curry 
favor with the jury and thereby defeat the aggravated robbery charge by admitting his 
responsibility for the well-established misdemeanor beer theft. Id; see also R61-62, 
addendum C. There is thus apparent on the record a conceivable and reasonable tactical 
basis for trial counsel's non-objection and affirmation of an aggravated robbery instruction 
which did not include this uncontested element. See Clark, 2004 UT 25, ^ 6 (requiring 
defendants claiming ineffectiveness to demonstrate "that there was no conceivable tactical 
basis for counsel's actions") (internal quotations and citations omitted, emphasis in original); 
see also Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ 19; Parker, 2000 UT 51,1j 11. 
31 
No prejudice. Even assuming arguendo that trial counsel's performance was 
unreasonable and thus deficient, no prejudice resulted. This is because the missing element 
of intent to permanently or temporarily deprive was never at issue. 
To demonstrate prejudice, a "defendant must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Moreover, "proof of ineffective 
assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality." 
Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993). 
Incomplete elements instructions are not invariably prejudicial; whether omission of 
an element of the crime is prejudicial depends on the facts of the case. This Court has 
previously recognized that if the facts indisputably establish an element and the element is 
not an issue at trial, as here, then a trial court's failure to instruct on the element is not 
prejudicial. See State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287,1292 (Utah App. 1994) (holding failure 
to instruct on nonmarriage element of rape statute was harmless because nonmarriage was 
undisputed at trial). See also State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, ffif 48, 51, 82 P.3d 1106 (holding 
that an erroneous instruction that defendant who acted knowingly could be guilty of 
attempted murder was harmless on the facts of the case); State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66,52 P.3d 
1210 (holding that failure to instruct the jury on the "other than a party" element of felony 
murder was not error where defendant never contended child sexual abuse victim was a party 
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to the felony that resulted in her death); State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048-1049 (Utah 
1984) (holding that omitting "knowing" mental state from elements instruction was not 
prejudicial in second-degree murder case). 
Here, defendant must establish as a "demonstrable reality," Fernandez, 870 P.2d at 
877, that had trial counsel objected to the aggravated robbery instruction, the trial court 
would have included the element of intent to permanently or temporarily deprive, and that 
"the facts of this case do not support a conviction" for aggravated robbery under a complete 
instruction. State v. Finlayson, 994 P.2d 1243, 1249 (Utah 2000). Defendant has not and 
cannot make this showing. 
For all the reasons set forth above, a complete instruction here would have changed 
nothing. Defendant's defense was not that he intended to return the beer momentarily; 
indeed, defendant and his cohorts almost immediately began drinking the stolen beer. See 
R244:124. Rather, defendant's defense was that he did not take the beer in a forceful or 
threatening manner. See R244:l 18-124; see also R244:164, 177, 179-181. Thus, even if 
the jury had been instructed that defendant had to have the intent to permanently or 
temporarily deprive the 7-Eleven of the stolen beer, a reasonable jury could have found that 
well-established and undisputed intent here, particularly in view of defendant's concession. 
See Stevenson, 884 P.2d at 1292. 
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Accordingly, there is no reasonable likelihood that an aggravated robbery instruction 
which included an intent "to permanently or temporarily deprive" would have altered the trial 
outcome. Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance thus fails on the prejudice prong. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's aggravated robbery conviction should be affirmed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The State requests oral argument. Oral argument is allowed in all cases unless the 
court concludes that (1) the appeal is frivolous; (2) the dispositive issues have been recently 
and authoritatively decided; or (3) the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in 
the briefs and record and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral 
argument. Rule 29(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Here, the decisional process 
would be significantly aided by oral argument. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on _j_ June 2005. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
M^mm^^^^^ *—-
/ Assistant Attorney General 
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The threatening of a witness immediately after the 
commission of a crime, or after that person is accused of a 
crime that has been committed, is not sufficient in itself to 
establish the defendant's guilt. However, such threat, if 
proved, may be considered by you in light of all other proven 
facts in the case in determining guilt or innocence. 
Although consciousness of guilt may be inferred from a 
threat, it does not necessarily reflect actual guilt of the 
crime charged. Therefore, whether or not evidence of a threat 
shows a consciousness of guilt and the significance, if any, to 
be attached to any such evidence are matters exclusively within 




Jason Schatz (Bar # 9969) 
Schatz & Anderson 
Attorneys for Defendant 
356 E. 900 S. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Phone (801) 746-0447 
Fax (801) 579-0606 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS, 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
Harold Netzler, : MOTION TO REMAND PURSUANT TO 
RULE 23B OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
Defendant/Appellant, : APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
v. : CASE # 20040471-C A 
State of Utah, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee. : 
COMES NOW the Defendant/Appellant, Harold Netzler, by and through his attorney, 
Jason Schatz, and hereby moves the Utah Court of Appeals to enter an order remanding this case 
to the Third District Court pursuant to Rule 23 B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure for 
entry of findings of fact necessary for the Utah Court of Appeals' determination of the 
Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The Defendant was tried before a jury in Third District Court, the Honorable Robin Reese 
presiding, on February 19, 2004. At trial he was convicted for Aggravated Robbery and the final 
COPY 
waiting car with the two packs of beer followed by Mr. Anthony and the three suspects fled the 
scene. Harold was apprehended later that morning without incident and admitted to stealing the 
beer. 
INNEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM 
"To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, fa defendant first must 
demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard 
of reasonable professional judgement.'" State v. Bluff 2002 UT 66/[f 29., 52 P.3d 1210 (quoting 
State v. Litherland 2000 UT 76^ 19, 12 P.3d 92). cert, denied, 537 U.S. 1172. 123 S.Ct. 999 
(2003). "Second, the defendant must show that counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial— 
i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." Id. (quotations and citation omitted); see also 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). It is the position of 
Harold Netzler that his trial counsel was ineffective due to the fact that his trial counsel failed to 
make contact with several potential defense witness or to call them to testify at trial, nor did he 
request a continuance in order to secure their attendance at trial. This failure fell below a 
reasonable standard of care for a lawyer and adversely affected the presentation of the 
Defendant's case at trial. 
Prior to trial, Harold's trial counsel, Clayton Simms, had been advised of the existence of 
several potential witnesses who could be called to testify at trial regarding the character and 
reputation for truthfulness of the victim, Terry Rowland, as well as the fact that she had told 
several different accounts of the events surrounding the allegations and charges against Harold 
for allegedly threatening her in an attempt to get her not testify at trial. At the time of trial in this 
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several witnesses willing and able to come to court and testify regarding Terry Rowland's 
reputation for truthfulness as well as the differing stories she has told other employees regarding 
the incident involving Harold Netzler, Mr. Simms called no witnesses at trial to impeach Terry 
Rowland's credibility. Mr. Simms' only attempt at attacking the credibility of Terry Rowland, 
the state's primary witness and the only witness who gave testimony or evidence regarding the 
alleged threat by Ruland Anthony which turned a run of the mill beer run theft into an aggravated 
robbery, was to inquire about a welfare fraud charge which Terry Rowland had pled guilty to in 
1991. Mr. Simms presented no independent evidence or testimony regarding Terry Rowland's 
credibility as a witness. 
Following Harold's conviction at trial of Aggravated Robbery, Harold's family gathered 
up enough money to retain private defense counsel for purposes of Harold's sentencing and 
appeal of the Aggravated Robbery Conviction and to represent Harold on the pending Witness 
Tampering charge. As Harold's new defense counsel, I retained the services of a private 
investigator to interview the other employees of the 7-11 which were mentioned by Tina Spann 
and John Kamai. The defense's private investigator contacted and/or interviewed several 
witnesses including, Cindy Raymond, the other employee who was working with Terry Rowland 
on the night of the alleged robbery, Jenny Littlefield, the manage of the 7-11 store where the 
robbery took place, and Allen Larsen, Terry Rowland's co-worker at the 7-11. The interviews 
with these witnesses revealed that Terry Rowland had a very poor reputation for truthfulness and 
was less than trustworthy and that she had been untruthful regarding her statements, particularly 
with regard to the alleged instances of witness tampering. After these interviews were 
conducted, the defendant's new defense counsel contacted the Salt Lake County District Attorney 
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charge. 
REQUEST FOR REMAND FOR FINDINGS 
THEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the 
Defendant, Harold Netzler, hereby moves this court to enter an order remanding the above 
entitled case to the Third District Court for an evidentiary hearing to enter findings necessary to 
the appellate court's determination of the Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
The Defendant specifically requests that the trial court enter findings of facts regarding his trial 
counsel's failure to contact and/or secure the attendance of several potential defense witnesses as 
outlined above. 
DATED this 10^ day of January, 2005. 
Jason/Schatz 








' UTAH APPELLA^ COURTS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS UlHn^r. 
FEB 2 3 2005 
ooOoo 
j FE3 2 *;.;: / 
State of UtaE, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Harold Netzler, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
ORDER DENYING REMAND 
Case No. 20040471-CA 
Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson, and Thorne. 
This is before the court on a motion for remand under rule 
23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. A remand is 
available only upon "a nonspeculative allegation of facts, not 
fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, could 
support a determination that counsel was ineffective," including 
facts that show "the claimed deficient performance" and "the 
claimed prejudice suffered by the appellant as a result of the 
claimed deficient performance." Utah R. App. P. 23B (a), (b) . 
"A defendant must specifically identify uncalled witnesses 
and identify specific facts of their testimony that might have 
helped his case." State v. Johnston, 2000 UT App 290,110, 13 
P.3d 175. Netzler has not provided affidavits from the proposed 
witnesses specifying their testimony. He presents affidavits 
from two intermediate witnesses establishing that trial counsel 
was informed, the day before trial, that some co-workers 
questioned the clerk's credibility. However, there is nothing 
that presents the specific facts the co-workers would have 
presented in their testimony. 
Additionally, Netzler has failed to show prejudice by the 
alleged failure to investigate and call the co-workers. Netzler 
admitted to the theft of the beer. The case was not about 
identity or credibility of witnesses. Netzler's own confession 
corroborated the clerk's version of the events of the robbery. 
^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on February 23, 2005, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States 
mail to the parties listed below: 
MATTHEW D BATES 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
STEVE ANDERSON 
JASON SCHATZ 
SCHATZ & ANDERSON 
356 E 900 S 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Dated this February 23, 2005. 
Deputy Clerk Case No. 20040471 




You are instructed that you may consider retail theft as a lesser included 
offense of Aggravated Robbery. You cannot find the Defendant guilty of retail 
theft unless all of the following elements are true beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. On or about February 6, 2003; 
2. Defendant, Harold Augustin Netzler; 
3. Took possession of, concealed, carried away, transferred or caused to be 
carried away or transferred; 
4. Merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale in a retail 
mercantile establishment; 
5. Without paying the retail value of the merchandise; 
6. And that all acts took place in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
If the prosecution has failed to prove any one of these elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant, Harold Augustin Netzler, not 
guilty of retail theft. However, if the prosecution has proved each one of the 
foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant 









You are instructed that you shall consider the crime of retail theft, which is 
a lesser included offense of Aggravated Robbery. You may find the defendant 
guilty or not guilty of Aggravated Robbery or guilty or not guilty of Retail Theft, 
but you may not find the defendant guilty of both Retail Theft and Aggravated 
Robbery. 
You cannot find the Defendant guilty of retail theft unless all of the 
following elements are true beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. On or about February 6, 2003; 
2. Defendant, Harold Augustin Netzler; 
3. Took possession of, concealed, carried away, transferred or caused to be 
carried away or transferred; 
4. Merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale in a retail 
mercantile establishment; 
5. Without paying the retail value of the merchandise; 
6. And that all acts took place in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
If the prosecution has failed to prove any one of the elements of Retail Theft 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant, Harold Augustin 
Netzler, not guilty of retail theft. However, if the prosecution has proved each one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
Defendant guilty of retail theft. f^ l \^5^ 
INSTRUCTION NO. * ^  
Before you can convict the defendant, Harold A. Netzler 
of the offense of Aggravated Robbery as charged in the 
information, you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a 
reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of 
that offense: 
1. That on or about the 6th day of February, JM&Z, in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Harold A. 
Netzler, took personal property then in the possession of, or, 
from the person or immediate presence of Terye Rowland; and 
2. That such taking was unlawful; and 
3. That such taking was intentional; and 
4. That such taking was against the will of Terye 
Rowland; and 
5. That such taking was accomplished by means of force or 
fear; and 
6. That in the course of committing such taking, a 
dangerous weapon was used. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Robbery as charged 
in the information. If, on the other hand, you are not 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the 
foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 0 
You are instructed that you May consider the crime of retail theft, which is 
a lesser included offense of Aggravated Robbery. You may find the defendant 
guilty or not guilty of Aggravated Robbery or guilty or not guilty of Retail Theft, 
but you may not find the defendant guilty of both Retail Theft and Aggravated 
Robbery. 
You cannot find the Defendant guilty of retail theft unless all of the 
following elements are true beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. On or about February 6, 2003; 
2. Defendant, Harold Augustin Netzler; 
3. Took possession of, concealed, carried away, transferred or caused to be 
carried away or transferred; 
4. Merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale in a retail 
mercantile establishment; 
5. Without paying the retail value of the merchandise; 
6. And that all acts took place in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
If the prosecution has failed to prove any one of the elements of Retail Theft 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant, Harold Augustin 
Netzler, not guilty of retail theft. However, if the prosecution has proved each one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
Defendant guilty of retail theft. 
